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6.1  Introduction 
This paper develops a dynamic model of inflation and external capital 
flows that incorporates some key macroeconomic features of the more 
advanced industrializing economies. Although the model is quite gen- 
eral, it is motivated  by recent events in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America, where wide-ranging economic reforms initiated in the 1970s 
produced dramatic-and  ultimately unsustainable-movements  in ex- 
ternal accounts and real exchange rates. As observed by Diaz-Alejan- 
dro (1981), the measures undertaken in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay 
coincided initially with steep increases in the prices of nontraded goods 
relative  to tradables, with  weak current-account balances and with 
massive foreign reserve accumulation. A goal of this study is to  analyze 
the channels through which policy initiatives of the type undertaken 
in the Southern Cone influence the economy's long-run position and 
its transitional behavior.' 
On the price side the economy studied here is characterized by a 
crawling-peg exchange rate regime  and  sluggish nominal  wages  that 
adjust to labor market disequilibrium and inflation expectations. Non- 
tradable goods use imports as intermediate production inputs, and so 
there is an immediate pass-through  of exchange rate changes to do- 
mestic goods prices.  On the asset side there may be restrictions  on 
private capital-account transactions, but the model encompasses both 
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polar cases-free  capital mobility and complete capital immobility- 
within a single framework.*  This facilitates study of the macroeconomic 
effects of capital-account liberalization. Under capital mobility the model 
traces the dynamic path of the real exchange rate (the price of tradables 
in terms of nontradables) and the economy’s net external assets. Similar 
paths are traced for cases in which private capital is immobile, but the 
economy’s external assets are then owned entirely by the public ~ector.~ 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 6.2 sets out the basic 
structure of the model. The real exchange rate occupies a central po- 
sition, for its level affects both production and consumption decisions 
while its time path influences the real domestic interest rate. 
Section 6.3 works out the model’s dynamics under perfect f~resight.~ 
Asymptotically, the economy approaches a long-run equilibrium char- 
acterized by simultaneous internal and external balance. The nature of 
the path  leading there depends, however,  on whether  a rise  in  the 
relative price of  tradables improves or worsens the current account. 
The dynamics of the economy will not generally display the monotonic 
relationship between external assets and the real exchange rate char- 
acterizing the transition paths of most flexible-price, portfolio-balance 
models. In particular,  the approach to long-run equilibrium may  be 
oscillatory. 
Liberalization of the capital account is taken up in section 6.4. The 
key result of this section concerns the short-term effect of liberalization 
on the real exchange rate. When the prereform domestic interest rate 
exceeds the depreciation-adjusted world rate, the removal of  impedi- 
ments to private capital movement causes an initial period of real ap- 
preciation.  A  current-account  deficit emerges upon  removing  those 
impediments, but boom turns into slump as the economy converges to 
a steady state in which the level of external claims is lower than it was 
before liberalization.  In the long run there is a real depreciation, an 
example of a more general principle that is also established in section 
6.4: Any disturbance that leads to a long-run decline in external assets 
must also depreciate the long-run real exchange rate (assuming that 
the domestic capital stock is held constant). A similar result has been 
noted in other contexts by Bruno (1976) and Obstfeld (1985). 
Section 6.5 studies the effects of  devaluation and disinflation, with 
the latter defined as a  permanent,  credible lowering of  the rate of 
currency depreciation. Devaluation is nonneutral in the long run, lead- 
ing to an eventual rise in  external claims and a long-run real appreci- 
ation.  In the  short run devaluation may  occasion a current-account 
deficit or a domestic contraction, however. When capital is immobile 
disinflation has effects that are the opposite of those realized under a 
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followed  by a long-run real appreciation and increase in  net foreign 
assets. But in the model set out below, a change in the crawl rate is 
neutral when capital is fully mobile, even though the price of nontraded 
goods is temporarily fixed. The section concludes by considering pos- 
sible sources of  nonneutrality suggested in the literature. 
Section 6.6 summarizes the main results and briefly discusses some 
limitations of  the analysis in the light of actual events in the Southern 
Cone. An appendix contains technical details concerning the model’s 
dynamics. 
6.2  A General Model 
This  section  describes a  small, open economy characterized by  a 
crawling-peg exchange rate regime and short-run inflexibility of nominal 
wages. Two goods are produced: a composite tradable priced exoge- 
nously in the world market, and a nontradable good whose price reflects 
the cost of domestic labor and imported intermediates. The response 
of the real wage to labor market pressure provides a first component 
of the economy’s intrinsic dynamics. A second source is private saving, 
which drives the stock of net foreign assets to its long-run level. De- 
tailed discussion of the economy’s dynamic behavior is deferred until 
section 6.3. Here, I merely set out the structure of the economy. 
Under a crawling peg the exchange rate follows a path determined 
by the central bank. To  maintain the announced exchange rate when 
there is free capital mobility, the bank must accommodate any shift in 
domestic money demand through foreign exchange intervention. When 
capital  controls are in  place, however,  residents may not  purchase 
foreign currency assets and exporters must sell to the monetary au- 
thority any foreign exchange earned. To peg the exchange rate under 
private capital immobility, therefore, the central bank need intervene 
only to cover any trade imbalance. 
It is not necessary to specify the degree of capital mobility in this 
section. The model’s generality in this respect will prove useful when 
the liberalization of the capital account is studied in section 6.4 below. 
6.2.1  Goods Prices and Production 
On the production side the country examined here is a variant of the 
dependent economy studied  by  Salter (1959) and  many  subsequent 
writers. Let E denote the exchange rate (the domestic money price of 
foreign money) and PT’  the foreign currency price of the composite 
tradable good. Under the small-country assumption PT*  is parametric; 
arbitrage guarantees that in the absence  of trade impediments and trans- 204  Maurice Obstfeld 
port  costs, the corresponding domestic money  price  of  tradables  is 
given by: 
(1)  PT  = EpT* 
A useful generalization of this framework would differentiate between 
imports and exports and allow for commercial restrictions that separate 
domestic from world prices. That generalization is forgone here in order 
to focus on the effects of financial policies. The normalization PT" =  1 
is adopted, so that PT = E according to equation (1). 
Tradable commodities are produced using capital and labor. Capital 
operates only in the tradable sector, but labor is free to move between 
both sectors of the economy. If  W denotes the resulting economywide 
nominal wage, the supply function for tradables is: 
(2)  y= = yT(P'/W),  yT' > 0. 
The derived demand for labor, also increasing in its argument, is denoted: 
(3)  nT = nT(PT/W). 
Output in the nontradables sector is produced using labor (nH) and 
imported intermediate materials (my  according to a fixed-coefficients 
technology. The production function for these domestic goods is: 
(4)  yH = min{nH,amH}, 
where intermediate imports are indistinguishable from final tradables. 
The parameter l/a is the amount of the intermediate material that must 
be combined with a unit of labor to produce a unit of  the domestic 
good. Constant returns to scale prevail in the nontradables sector ac- 
cording to equation (4), so that output yE1  is demand determined. Factor 
demands are given by: 
(5)  nH  = yH,  mfl = yH/a. 
In equilibrium the price of  domestic goods is given by the zero-profit 
condition: 
(6)  PH = W + (PT/a)  = W + (E/a). 
6.2.2  Asset Markets 
Residents hold in their portfolios domestic high-powered money, M; 
domestic bonds paying an interest rate R;  and (when private capital 
mobility is permitted) foreign bonds, B",  having a face value fixed in 
foreign currency terms and paying the world interest rate R'. The do- 
mestic banking system is  not explicitly modeled here. In addition to 
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ponent of domestic wealth that can include, for example, titles to  capital 
operating in the tradables sector. This exogenous component of wealth 
has a fixed, strictly positive value, k, in terms of tradables (that is, in 
terms of foreign currency); the determination of k is outside the scope 
of the model. Under a regime of capital controls, B' is taken to be equal 
to 
Foreigners do not participate  in the domestic bond  market. Under 
free capital mobility, R  = R'  + DEIE, where D is the time-derivative 
operator and perfect  foresight  is  assumed. In  words, domestic and 
foreign bonds are assumed to be perfect  substitutes, so that interest 
parity holds when capital is mobile. When capital controls are in place 
the domestic credit market is essentially a curb market and R generally 
differs from the depreciation-adjusted  world  rate (see Bruno  1979; 
McKinnon and Mathieson  198  1 ;  van Wijnbergen  1983b). 
Foreigners do not hold domestic money. Because it is assumed that 
there is no outside domestic government  debt, aggregate domestic nom- 
inal assets, A,  are given by: 
(7)  A  = M  + EB'  + Ek. 
The money market equilibrium condition is: 
(8)  M  = L(R)A,  L' < 0. 
Under capital immobility M is a predetermined variable that changes 
only  as a result  of current-account imbalances and domestic credit 
creation by the central bank. (The current account, of course, equals 
the balance  of payments when there is  no private international  bor- 
rowing or lending.) As equation  (8) shows, continuous asset market 
equilibrium is in this case maintained through adjustments in the do- 
mestic nominal interest rate, R. 
Under capital mobility, however,  the domestic interest rate is  the 
sum of the exogenous world interest rate, R', and the policy-determined 
devaluation rate, DEIE. The money stock is now the jumping variable 
that adjusts instantaneously to preserve asset market equilibrium: for 
a given  rate of currency depreciation, the central bank  can peg the 
level of the exchange rate only if it automatically supplies to the public 
the money stock dictated by the right-hand side of equation (8). A  is 
predetermined in the model whether capital is immobile or mobile. 
6.2.3  Consumers 
nontraded or domestic goods. Define the real exchange rate, q, by: 
(9)  q = ElPH. 
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By equation (6), the real exchange rate must be smaller than the tech- 
nological coefficient a in equilibrium if  W and PH  are always positive, 
or in symbols: 
q < a. 
A fraction u(q)  of expenditure z  falls on tradables,  where u is a de- 
creasing function of q. Final consumption of tradables may therefore 
be written: 
(10)  cyq,  z) = u(q)z/q,  u‘ < 0; 
and the demand for nontradables takes the form: 
(11) 
Let y be the average share of tradables in the overall consumer price 
index. (y can be thought of as a long-run average value of u [q].) The 
expected local inflation rate under perfect foresight is then y (DE/E) 
+ (1 - y) (DPH/PT.  (The derivatives are right-hand derivatives, as 
always.) Private absorption, z, is a function of real domestic wealth 
and the real interest rate, such that: 
cH(q, z) = [I - u(q)lz. 
(12)  z  = z[A/E~(PH)~-~,  R -  y(DE/E) -  (I - y)(DPH/PT]. 
As  usual, an increase in  real assets stimulates  absorption,  while an 
increase in the real interest rate depresses it. In symbols, z1 > 0 and 
z2 < 0. V;.  denotes the partial derivative 8f[xl, . . .,  x,l/8xi.) 
6.2.4  The Labor Market and Price Adjustment 
The nominal wage is taken to be a predetermined, or nonjumping, 
variable that can adjust only gradually. The determinants of  nominal 
wage inflation are excess labor demand and expected consumer price 
inflation, as in Obstfeld (1982). 
Let no denote the “natural”  level of aggregate employment, which 
is assumed to be constant. If  perfect foresight is assumed, the wage 
evolves according to: 
(13) 
From equation (6), the wage and the domestic goods price are related 
by  W  = PH - (E/a).  Equation (13) may therefore be manipulated to 
yield: 
(14)  DPH/PH  = n(q)(nT  + nH - no) + DE/E, 
where 
(15) 
DWIW  = +(nT + nH - no) + y(DE/E) + (1 - y)(DPH/PT. 
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Equations (14) and (15) show how currency depreciation and excess 
labor demand govern price inflation in the nontradables sector. 
6.2.5  The Monetary and Fiscal Authorities 
It is convenient to consolidate the budget constraints of the mon- 
etary and fiscal authorities. All domestic liabilities of the central bank 
take  the form  of  high-powered money.  On the asset side the bank 
holds domestic credit, C, and foreign bonds, whose foreign currency 
value is denoted F.  The balance-sheet identity of the central bank is: 
The last term on the right-hand side of equation (16) is the sum of past 
capital gains on official reserves, which inflate the domestic money 
value of bank assets without increasing monetary liabilities. As will be 
seen below in  section 6.5, equation (16), which corrects for smooth 
movements in E,  can easily be modified to take account of capital gains 
resulting from discrete major devaluations. 
The fiscal authority levies personal taxes to help finance its con- 
sumption of tradables (g'> and nontradables (gH). An additional source 
of revenue is the interest earned on the central bank's reserves, equal 
to ER'F  in terms of domestic money. Any fiscal deficit is financed 
through domestic credit creation (the government issues no interest- 
bearing debt). Let T denote nominal taxes and G, nominal government 
consumption (equal to EgT + PHgH). The monetized  deficit is then 
given by: 
(17)  DC  = G -  ER'F - T. 
The rate of  domestic credit creation  implied by  equation (17) may 
exceed  or fall short of  the rate at which  domestic money  demand 
increases (the time derivative of the right-hand side of  equation [8] ). 
Let Md  denote nominal money demand. According to equation (16), 
continuous money market equilibrium then requires that: 
Domestic credit growth in excess of money demand growth leads to a 
balance-of-payments deficit, so that part of  the fiscal deficit is effec- 
tively financed through central bank borrowing abroad. After substi- 
tuting equation (18) into equation (17), integrating forward, and apply- 
ing  the  appropriate  transversality  condition,  one  obtains  the 
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(19)  /-[g:  + (gf’/q,J]e-R’(s-r)dds 
d  FT  + r[(TylEs)  + (DM~/~~)]e-R*(”-r)dds. 
Constraint (19) limits the present foreign exchange value of government 
consumption to that of government revenue from taxes and seigniorage, 
plus initial foreign reserves. Seigniorage revenue is in turn limited by 
the public’s willingness to add to its nominal balances. 
It is assumed that the central bank follows the domestic credit rule: 
(20)  DC = (DE/E)M 
to avoid protracted payments imbalances. To ensure that credit creation 
covers the government’s  cash-flow  needs when  equation (20) is fol- 
lowed, the government adjusts taxes, T, endogenously according to: 
(21)  T = G - ER’F - (DE/E)M. 
It can be shown that under the foregoing assumptions, constraint (19) 
will necessarily hold as an equality, provided the economy is dynam- 
ically stable (see Obstfeld 1985). 
6.3  Dynamics of  the Model 
It is now time to pursue the dynamic implications of the structure 
described in section 6.2. To  do so, I reduce the model to a system of 
two differential equations: one for the real exchange rate, q, and one 
for the net external asset stock of the economy as a whole, K  = F 
+ B’.  Because the nation’s foreign assets are given by the history of 
the current account, K  is a predetermined variable. Because the nom- 
inal wage is predetermined and the exchange rate is pegged, the zero- 
profit condition of equation (6)  implies that q is predetermined as well. 
Equation (14) gives the time derivative of q: 
(22)  Dq/q =  -~(q)(n‘ + nH - no). 
Equations (3), (6), and (9) imply that: 
(23)  nT = n‘(q),  nT’ > 0. 
The equilibrium condition for the domestic goods market is: 
(24) 
By equation (9,  labor demand in the nontradables sector, nH,  is equal 
to CH + gH. 
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To  complete the derivation  of  the dynamic law for q, I  must also 
show that absorption, z, can be expressed in terms of  q and K'.  The 
definition of the real exchange rate, q, allows an expression of the real 
interest rate as: 
R - (DE/E) + (1 - y)(Dq/q). 
A rise in the expected rate of real depreciation, all else equal, implies 
a rise in the real interest rate. Equation (7) can be used to write (12) 
as: 
(25)  z  = z{q'-Y[(M/E)  + B" + k],  R - (DE/E) + (1 - y)(Dq/q)}. 
Next, note that D(M/E) = DM/E -  (DE/E)  (ME)  = DF  (by equations 
(16) and (20)), and so (MIE) = F  + x,  where x is a constant that can 
be calculated from equation (16).6 Finally, equation (8) can be solved 
for the equilibrium domestic interest rate, such that: 
(26)  R = R(K' + x), R' < 0. 
Under perfect capital mobility, R(K' + x) = R'  + (DEIE), and so R' 
= 0. But when private capital is immobile, K" = F  and R'  < 0. In 
the latter case a rise in K  is simply a rise in international reserves that 
increases domestic liquidity, depressing the local rate of interest. 
The foregoing observations lead to the equation: 
(27)  z  = z[q'-.(K + x + k), R(K + x) 
- (DE/E) + (1 - y)(Dq/q)l. 
With the aid of  equations (11), (23), and (27), equation (22) may now 
be written: 
(28)  Dqlq =  -dq){nT(q)  + [1 - u(q>lz[q' W + x + k), 
From this equation, one can obtain the reduced-form law of motion: 
(29)  Dqlq = r(q,  K). 
It is assumed that: 
R(K + X) - (DE/E)  + (1 - y)(Dq/q)l + gH -  no}. 
(30)  r, < 0,  r2  < 0. 
Thus, a rise in q raises the demand for labor in both the tradable and 
the domestic goods sectors, leading in turn to an increasing real wage 
and, through equation (6), a falling (that is, appreciating) real exchange 
rate. Similarly, a rise in K,  by stimulating the demand for nontradables, 
leads to excess labor demand in the domestic goods sector and, again, 
an appreciating real exchange rate.7 The appendix spells out the math- 
ematical conditions under which the inequalities in (30) hold. One con- 
dition worth mentioning here is that overall wealth, K  + x + k, be 210  Maurice Obstfeld 
positive. This is assumed from now on, although it is  stronger than 
necessary for (30). 
Let us now  turn  to the  dynamic equation for K.  The growth of 
nominal private assets equals private saving out of disposable income, 
and so by equation (7): 
(31)  DA = DM  + DE(B* + k) + EDB" 
= EyT + PHyH  + ER'B'  + DE(B" + k) - T 
- EcT -  PHcH  - EmH. 
Equation (23) implies that yT  can be written as an increasing function 
of the real exchange rate, q. After the use of equations (3,  (lo), (II), 
(16), (20), (21), (24), (27), and (29), equation (31) therefore becomes: 
(32)  DK = yT(~)  + R'K - gT 
- u(q)z[q'-W + x  + k),  R(K' + XI 
- il/a){[l  - r+iq)lz[ql-y(K  + x  + k),  R(K + X) 
= .n(q, K). 
- (DE/E) + (1 - -mq,  miiq 
- (DE/E) + (1 - Ym,  ~11  + gH> 
Equation (32) displays the current-account balance as the difference 
between the national production of tradables (including services) and 
the national absorption of tradables. The relative-price effect of  a real 
depreciation tends to improve the current account by  increasing the 
output of traded goods and by discouraging their consumption. But by 
shifting demand toward nontradables, a rise in q leads directly to in- 
creased imports of intermediate materials. The overall relative-price 
effect is summarized by the Marshall-Lerner condition for the model, 
which states that with absorption held constant, a real depreciation has 
a positive effect on the current account, given by: 
(33) 
Inequality (33) must hold  in equilibrium because q can never exceed 
a (see the discussion following equation (9) above). But although the 
expenditure-switching effect of a real depreciation is always positive, 
it is weakened by the need for imported intermediates in the domestic 
goods sector. 
The absorption effects of  a rise in q do tend to worsen the current 
account:  a real  depreciation raises  the real  value  of  private  wealth 
(under my  assumptions) and lowers the expected real interest  rate, 
thereby raising expenditure z. It follows that the sign of a,  is indeter- 
minate. The same is true of the sign of f12, but there are sound theo- 
retical reasons for assuming that a rise in net foreign assets, K,  causes 
the current account to deteriorate. Accordingly: 
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(34)  a,  4  0,  < 0. 
Again, the appendix discusses the precise mathematical conditions un- 
derlying the inequalities in (34). 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the two possible stable configurations of 
the dynamic system consisting of equations (29) and (32). The long- 
run or steady-state  levels of the real exchange rate and net foreign asset 
stock are denoted ql.  and K:,  respectively. (The existence and unique- 
ness of these two are assumed.) In the first of  these diagrams (corre- 
sponding to the case a,  > 0) the economy cycles during its approach 
to long-run equilibrium. In the second (corresponding to the case 0, 
< 0) the economy’s transition path is either monotonic or a half-cycle. 
An interesting feature of the dynamics is the possibility that a depre- 
ciating  (appreciating) real  exchange rate will  accompany a  current- 
account surplus (deficit) along portions  of  the transition  path. This 
conjuncture is  not typical of flexible-price, portfolio-balance  models 
(for example, Calvo and Rodriguez 1977). 
Because F, < 0 and a2  < 0, the stability condition for the system’s 
linear approximation near (qx,  K)  is: 
(35) 
K* 
r,a2  - r2a,  > 0, 
* 
OK  =O 
Fig. 6.1  Adjustment to the steady state (R, > 0). 212  Maurice Obstfeld 
K* 
Fig. 6.2  Adjustment to the steady state (0,  < 0) 
where all functions are henceforth evaluated at long-run equilibrium. 
From expressions derived  in the appendix, stability condition (35) is 
equivalent to: 
(36)  0 < -R*[nT’ -  U‘Z  + (1 - u)(I  - Y)q-Yzl(K* + x  + k)] 
+ (ql-21 + zzR‘){(nT’ - a’z)[(u/q) + (1 - u)/a] 
+ (1 - db7’ -  {[(I  - (q/a)lu’ - (~~qMz~q)l}* 
The stability of the system does not require that f12 be negative, as is 
assumed in equation (34). When 0, > 0, equation (35) holds, and the 
trace condition qrl +  f12 < 0 is  satisfied, the model  has a  stable 
configuration in  which the Dqlq  = 0 and DK = 0 loci have negative 
slopes but (contrary to figure 6.2) the slope of the latter is greater in 
absolute value than the slope of the former. In the interest of conserving 
space, this possibility is pursued no further. 
Although the dynamic behavior of the economy appears qualitatively 
unaffected by the degree of capital mobility, the interpretation of the 
model  and any predictions  based  on it hinge on the regime  one as- 
sumes.8  When there are no private capital movements, B’  = 0 and K 
coincides with the central bank’s reserve stock, F.  In this case all net 
external lending  takes the form of  reserve movements, so that the 
current-account equation (32) can be interpreted as describing either 
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measured  in tradables. Under capital mobility, however, K  = B'  + 
F,  where B'  + F equals the consolidated external assets of the private 
and public sectors. Equation (32) again describes the current account, 
but it no longer applies to the balance of payments. Even though K' 
is predetermined, its components B*  and F are not when private capital 
is mobile. Private portfolio shifts will force foreign exchange interven- 
tion by the central bank that is recorded in the balance of payments. 
That intervention redistributes the ownership of K  between the private 
sector and the central bank, but it cannot cause an instantaneous  jump 
in the economy's overall external claims. 
6.4  Liberalization of the Capital Account 
The first policy action considered is the liberalization of the capital 
acco~nt.~  Initially, there is no trade in private external assets, and the 
domestic interest rate is a function of the predetermined money supply. 
Liberalization  takes the form of  a  complete removal  of  barriers to 
financial capital movements. The economy is assumed to be at its long- 
run equilibrium when the liberalization takes place. 
The effect of the liberalization depends on the relationship between 
the interest rate prevailing before the liberalization and the depreciation- 
adjusted  world  rate. It is most natural to assume that  the domestic 
interest rate exceeds R'  + (DE/E)  prior to the reform, so that there is 
a fall in the cost of credit when the reform goes into effect.'" The initial 
and long-run effects of the policy change can be visualized  with the 
aid of figures 6.3 and 6.4. 
The fall in the domestic interest rate raises absorption for every level 
of q and K.  Accordingly,  the Dq = 0 and DK = 0 schedules shift 
downward: for a given real exchange rate, a lower level of wealth is 
now required for both internal balance (labor market equilibrium) and 
external balance  (current-account equilibrium).  I'  The real  exchange 
rate begins to appreciate in the face of excess domestic demand, and 
a current-account deficit emerges. As wealth and expenditure subse- 
quently fall, the real appreciation ceases and is reversed. The under- 
employment that appears at this point is gradually eliminated (perhaps 
with oscillations) as the economy approaches its new long-run equilib- 
rium. What is most noteworthy here is that in  spite of  its eventually 
deflationary effects, liberalization of the capital account may cause the 
economy to undergo a protracted initial phase of currency overvaluation. 
On the asset side the fall in the domestic interest rate raises money 
demand. The private sector reaches portfolio equilibrium by borrowing 
foreign exchange from abroad and selling it for domestic money.  Be- 
cause the central bank must purchase this foreign exchange to hold the 
exchange rate fixed, private borrowing leads to an instantaneous rise 
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I  Q 
Capital-account liberalization (a,  > 0). 
=o 
I  - 
Y 
Capital-account liberalization  (fl, < 0). 215  Capital Flows, the Current Account, and the Real Exchange Rate 
a transfer of external claims from the private sector (which becomes 
indebted to foreigners) to the central bank (which enjoys an offsetting 
increase in reserves). K,  however, cannot jump upon the institution 
of the reform. As external assets begin to fall in the wake of the lib- 
eralization, the balance of payments swings into deficit. 
The model suggests that in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, the easing 
of capital controls in the 1970s may have contributed to the real ap- 
preciations, external deficits, and capital inflows that accompanied the 
economic reform programs in those countries. Capital-account  liber- 
alization is likely to serve as only part of the explanation, however. In 
Chile, for example, the beginning of real appreciation  certainly predated 
the relaxation of external financial restrictions (see Edwards 1985). 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 suggest two results that have not yet been dem- 
onstrated. First, they suggest that the long-run external debt necessarily 
increases, a result  that is obvious only in the case RI  > 0 shown in 
figure 6.3. Second, they imply that liberalization necessarily entails a 
long-run depreciation (in contrast to the real appreciation that clearly 
emerges in the short run). It is an implication of the system's stability 
(as will be shown later) that the long-run external asset stock declines. 
On the assumption that it does, I will now argue that the real exchange 
rate, q,  must rise in the long run. The argument made is of independent 
interest in that it establishes a rather general proposition: Provided the 
domestic capital stock does not change, any disturbance that causes a 
decline in  steady-state external claims must also cause a rise in the 
steady-state real exchange rate. 
For a given long-run foreign asset stock, figure 6.5 shows the deter- 
mination of  long-run absorption, z, and the long-run relative price of 
tradables, q.  The ZZ, or internal balance, schedule in the figure shows 
combinations of q and z that clear the labor market (that is, that satisfy 
(28) with Dq = 0). The slope of the schedule is given by: 
(37) 
Points above ZZ are associated with an excess demand for labor. The 
XX,  or external balance, schedule shows q-z combinations consistent 
with a zero current account for a fixed value of K".  Its slope is: 
(38)  (dz/dq)l,  = bT'  -  {[I  - (ddla' 
(&/&)I,,  = - (nT' - a'z)/(l - a) < 0. 
-  (a/q))(z/q)n/[(a/q)  + (1 - a)/a~  > 0. 
Points above XX are characterized by external deficits, and XX shifts 
upward along an unchanging II schedule as K  rises.  Point A, at the 
intersection of the two schedules, is the sole point consistent with both 
internal and external balance. 
Under the maintained assumption that K  falls in the long run as a 
result of liberalization, suppose that long-run absorption returns to its 216  Maurice Obstfeld 
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Fig. 6.5  Absorption and the real exchange rate in the long run. 
prereform  level. Internal balance would then  require that long-run q 
also be at its prereform  level, ql. But with K  (and, hence, national 
income) lower, such a position, shown as point B in figure 6.5, would 
not be consistent with external balance; in fact, there would be a deficit. 
To  restore full  equilibrium  with  a  lower steady-state external asset 
stock, z must fall and q must rise from ql. This downward movement 
along ZZ brings the economy to point A.  It follows that if  the external 
debt rises in the long run, the real exchange rate, after falling in the 
short run, must ultimately rise above its initial level. 
It remains to establish that the stock of foreign claims does indeed 
fall in the long run. Direct calculation shows that long-run foreign assets 
move in the same direction as the sign of the expression: 
(39)  z2U(nT’ - u’z)[(u/q) + (1 - u)/al 
+ (1 - u)[y~‘  - {[I - (q/u)iu’ - wq))(z/q)in/(r,s2, - r2a,). 
Because zz < 0, stability condition (35)  implies that expression (39) is 
negative. 
6.5  Devaluation and Disinflation 
This section discusses the effects of abrupt changes in both the level 
and the rate of change of the exchange rate. An unanticipated discrete 
devaluation may or may not occasion an initial contraction, but in the 217  Capital Flows, the Current Account, and the Real Exchange Rate 
long run it appreciates the real exchange rate and increases the foreign 
asset stock. Disinflation, defined here as a permanent, unanticipated 
reduction in the rate of currency depreciation, is neutral under perfect 
capital mobility and rational expectations, price rigidities notwithstand- 
ing. But when private capital movements are prohibited, a fall in DEIE 
causes an initial slump followed by a cumulative balance-of-payments 
surplus and an eventual real appreciation. 
6.5.1  Devaluation 
The effects of a sharp rise in E are illustrated in figures 6.6 and 6.7. 
The monetary authority is assumed to deviate from rule (20) when it 
devalues, failing to match the exchange rate increase with a compen- 
sating increase in domestic credit. Devaluation therefore affects the 
economy in part  by decreasing the foreign exchange value of assets 
denominated  in  domestic currency-here,  the high-powered  money 
stock. The private sector capital loss, in turn, reduces absorption. In 
the model this effect  takes the form of a change  in  the relationship 
linking foreign reserves and the exchange rate-deflated  money stock 
MIE. 
Prior to devaluation, MIE = F + x, where, by equation (16): 
K* 
* 
Fig. 6.6  The effects of devaluation (a,  > 0). 
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Fig. 6.7  The effects of  devaluation (a,  < 0). 
Devaluation-induced  capital gains on foreign reserves are not auto- 
matically reflected in the monetary base but instead lead to the creation 
of artificial offsetting accounting liabilities on the central bank's balance 
sheet. Let the exchange rate rise at time  t from EF to E:; let  E = 
(E:  -  E;)/ E:  denote the percentage devaluation; and let M; be the 
level of the nominal money supply (and c-  the level of reserves) just 
before the devaluation takes place. For all  v 5  t, the central bank's 
balance sheet becomes: 
or 
(42)  MJE,  F, + x -  E(M,/E;) 
in the absence of further unanticipated devaluations (compare equation 
[40]). Equation (42) implies that for any level of external assets, de- 
valuation lowers the foreign exchange value of private wealth by the 
amount of the concomitant capital loss on domestic money holdings. 
(See Obstfeld 1986 for further discussion.) 
Devaluation lowers private wealth for any value of K',  so the two 
loci in figures 6.6 and 6.7 shift upward because, given q, a higher level 
of  foreign claims will  be  necessary  for internal  as well  as external 
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long-run level of foreign claims must increase. (This is obvious in the 
case illustrated  in  figure 6.6.) The arguments made  in  the previous 
section therefore imply that the real exchange rate falls in the long run. 
This real appreciation is coupled with a rise in steady-state absorption 
relative to the initial equilibrium of the economy. 
What  can be  said about  the economy’s transitional behavior?  In 
addition to shifting the economy’s steady state, devaluation also causes 
an instantaneous initial rise in the real exchange rate. Since the wage 
is predetermined, equation (6) yields the relative-price effect: 
(43)  dqldE = [l - (q/a)]/PH  > 0. 
It is clear from this equation (since PH = Elq) that the elasticity of q 
with respect to devaluation is smaller, the greater the import content 
of nontradables (that is, the smaller is a);  to the extent that devaluation 
raises costs in the domestic goods sector, its effect on relative final- 
goods prices is reduced. 
In figure 6.6, devaluation shifts the real exchange rate to the right 
of  the new Dqlq  = 0 locus, so that initially there is an expansion of 
employment and a current-account surplus. Over time foreign assets 
rise  and the  real exchange rate appreciates, with  the  economy ap- 
proaching its new resting point in a cyclical fashion. There is no reason 
in general why  the initial postdevaluation  position  of  the economy 
cannot be to the left of the new Dqlq = 0 schedule. This last possibility 
is the case of a contractionary devaluation, the initial effect of which 
is a slump in employment and a depreciating real exchange rate. Even 
in this case, increasing wealth eventually reverses these short-run ef- 
fects. The probability  that  devaluation is  contractionary  is  directly 
related in the present model to the importance of intermediates in the 
production of  nontradables (see also Krugman  and Taylor  1978 and 
Buffie 1986). It is worth reiterating that if  a is low, a large nominal 
devaluation may achieve only a minor real devaluation because of the 
substantial and immediate  pass-through of  import price  changes to 
domestic costs. In this case the short-run expansionary effects of the 
associated rise in q will be small relative to the contractionary wealth 
effects that shift the two schedules in figure 6.6 upward. 
Under capital immobility there is an initial liquidity squeeze and a 
rise in the domestic interest rate. But if the capital account has already 
been liberalized, there is a sharp capital inflow that immediately ex- 
pands central bank reserves and the monetary base so as to maintain 
the domestic interest rate at the depreciation-adjusted world level. 
Similar dynamics arise in the case shown in figure 6.7, although the 
economy’s approach to its long-run position is direct when R1  < 0. In 
this case, it is possible that a devaluation will occasion a temporary 
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the real exchange rate appreciates. Contractionary devaluation is pos- 
sible here, too, but only an expansionary devaluation can cause an 
initial deficit. 
The long-run nonneutrality of devaluation contrasts sharply with the 
asymptotic neutrality results stressed in the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments (Frenkel and Johnson 1976). The result is in part 
a consequence of the assumption that central bank reserves earn in- 
terest. Under capital immobility individuals save to rebuild their real 
balances after the sharp initial rise in prices. Steady-state foreign re- 
serves rise as a result, and because these reserves earn interest, national 
income and private absorption increase in the long run as well. When 
capital is mobile the liquidity effect of devaluation can be counteracted 
by capital inflows, but the negative wealth effect induces an initial fall 
in consumption and a long-run effect on national income similar to that 
arising when there are capital controls. 
It is noteworthy that in models incorporating the Ricardian equiva- 
lence of government borrowing and taxation, the wealth effect of de- 
valuation  disappears in  the mobile-capital case. This is because the 
increase in private external liabilities associated with the initial capital 
inflow is exactly offset by a rise in the present discounted value of 
expected future transfer payments from the government. These addi- 
tional transfer payments are simply the increased interest earnings on 
the higher stock of central bank foreign reserves. It is therefore possible 
for the private sector to rebuild its real balances instantaneously through 
foreign borrowing without changing its lifetime consumption possibil- 
ities. For an analysis of these questions in models based on individual 
intertemporal maximization, see Obstfeld (1981 ; 1986) and Stockman 
(1983). 
6.5.2  Exchange Rate Oriented Disinflation 
Let  us  now  consider the  consequences  of  a  credible, permanent 
reduction in  the rate of  devaluation, DEIE. In light of the Southern 
Cone experiences surveyed by Diaz-Alejandro (1981), it is of particular 
interest to ask under what circumstances an exchange rate based dis- 
inflation scheme causes a real appreciation of the currency. The two 
cases of  internationally immobile and mobile capital are examined in 
turn. 
Under capital immobility the domestic nominal interest rate is pre- 
determined.  A fall in  DEIE increases the real interest  rate (all else 
equal), leading to underemployment and a current surplus at the initial 
levels of q and K.  As (28) and (32) show, both the Dqlq = 0 and DK 
= 0 schedules therefore shift upward (see figure 6.8). Model stability 
requires that when fl, < 0, as is the case in figure 6.8, K rises in the 
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slopes upward. By the results of  section 6.4, the steady-state real ex- 
change rate appreciates. Indeed, an increase in the devaluation  rate 
has dynamic effects that are qualitatively identical to those of capital- 
account liberalization. 
In figure 6.8 there is  an initial  period  of  real  depreciation as the 
increase in the real interest rate leads to  underemployment. An external 
surplus emerges, and spending rises over time while real money hold- 
ings are built up and the domestic nominal and real interest rates fall. 
Excess demand for labor arises as the economy crosses the new Dqlq 
= 0 schedule. The real exchange rate appreciates, and external assets 
continue rising during the subsequent approach to the steady state. In 
the alternative configuration  of  the  model  (not pictured  here), the 
medium-term dynamics are similar, but the approach to long-run equi- 
librium is oscillatory. 
When capital is mobile the nominal interest rate is given by R'  + 
(DElE), and the domestic real rate is simply R'  + (I - y) (Dqlq).  A 
fall in DEIE leaves this real interest rate unchanged, for, as equations 
(28) and (32) show, it does not affect either of the schedules defining 
the system's dynamics. With rational expectations, therefore, a per- 
manent and credible reduction in  the rate of devaluation is neutral, in 
spite of the rigidity of domestic prices. 
It is instructive to ask why a change in the depreciation rate is neutral 
with capital mobility. There are two reasons for this. First, the central 
K* 
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bank’s commitment to peg the exchange rate forces it to accommodate 
fully the private-portfolio shift caused by the change. A fall in DEIE 
lowers the nominal  interest  rate and raises money  demand. But the 
public can increase its nominal  money holdings immediately by bor- 
rowing foreign exchange abroad and selling it to the central bank. This 
transaction raises official reserves but causes no change in the econ- 
omy’s overall income, wealth, or spending. The second factor ensuring 
neutrality  derives from the assumptions regarding expectations and 
wage behavior.  Because the rate of wage inflation can adjust instan- 
taneously, the fall in DEIE is matched immediately by an equal fall in 
DWIW, so that no subsequent change in employment need occur. The 
overall result is a sharp, permanent fall in the domestic inflation rate 
with no transitional variation in spending or employment. 
Neutrality  would  not  hold  if  the exchange  rate were  floating and 
disinflation took the form of a reduction  in  trend  monetary growth. 
Asset market equilibrium would then require a currency appreciation 
that would raise real wealth and expenditure. For a discussion of this 
effect, see Calvo and Rodriguez (1977). 
Regardless of the degree of capital mobility, the model as formulated 
gives little support to the notion that a reduction in the rate of upward 
crawl is itself a cause of real appreciation. Brief consideration of some 
mechanisms not included in the present model is therefore worthwhile. 
(The following list is, of course, not exhaustive.) 
Disinflation may lead to real appreciation if expectations of inflation 
in the nontradables sector are adaptive, as noted by Rodriguez (1982). 
When uncovered interest parity holds, a widely recognized fall in DEIE 
lowers the domestic nominal interest rate immediately but leaves DPH/ 
PH  unchanged in the short run. The associated fall in the real interest 
rate encourages expenditure and so lowers the relative price of trad- 
ables.  This fall in  the real  interest  rate is  to be contrasted with  the 
increase that occurs in the present model when expectations are rational 
but capital is internationally immobile. 
Dornbusch (1982) suggested that the rate of domestic price inflation, 
like the level of domestic prices, is sluggish. If this is so, a fall in the 
depreciation  rate tautologically forces an initial period  of real appre- 
ciation.  The rate of  domestic price  inflation  must eventually  fall  to 
match that in the tradables sector, but the dynamics of this process are 
likely to be complex. 
Buffie (1985) constructed a model in which banks hold nontradable 
claims to capital that are imperfectly substitutable for foreign bonds 
and endogenously priced. A reduction in DEIE raises banks’ demand 
for this  asset, driving up its  price  (Tobin’s q) and  thus investment 
demand. The result is again a short-run real appreciation. 
The present model has assumed for simplicitly that disposable  in- 
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gen (1983a) showed that this neglected channel  may lead to real ap- 
preciation if disposable income is defined properly so as to reflect the 
inflation tax on real balances. Because a lowering of the devaluation 
rate also lowers domestic price  inflation,  the inflation tax falls  and 
disposable  income rises. The resulting increase in consumption falls 
partially  on nontradables, driving their  relative price upward. Calvo 
(1983) also discussed this mechanism. 
Yet another channel of nonneutrality is suggested in the optimizing 
framework of Obstfeld (1981), which incorporated Ricardian  equiva- 
lence and Metzlerian target-wealth saving behavior. Disinflation causes 
a rise in desired nominal balances matched by a capital inflow and an 
increase in interest-bearing official reserves. Because individuals cap- 
italize expected government transfers, there is an increase in the pub- 
lic’s  perceived  consumption possibilities  and  a  rise  in  expenditure. 
Although the model does not explicitly encompass nontradables, this 
rise in expenditure is consistent with a real appreciation. 
The foregoing models all consider a permanent, unanticipated fall in 
DEIE rather than the preannounced, phased decline in the devaluation 
rate that was a hallmark of the Southern Cone plans. In Obstfeld (1985) 
I employed an intertemporal  maximizing model to study those kinds 
of schemes. Anticipated disinflation affects the economy by raising the 
path  of  an expenditure-based  real  interest  rate  reflecting  expected 
changes in the prices of nontradables and liquidity services. If inter- 
temporal substitution is sufficiently low, the immediate result is a rise 
in spending, an external deficit, and a real appreciation. The temporary 
real appreciation gives way to a long-run decline in the relative price 
of  nontradables. 
A final observation  has to do with the question of credibility.  As 
Calvo (1983) and others have emphasized, much depends on the pub- 
lic’s belief in official promises to avoid major discrete devaluations. If 
the public views a discontinuous  jump in the exchange rate as a pos- 
sibility, it will adjust its inflation  expectations and subsequent wage 
settlements accordingly. A persistent belief in a maxi-devaluation that 
does not  materialize will therefore lead  to an extended period  over 
which domestic prices rise more quickly than the exchange rate. Even 
if  the initial  fear of  devaluation  was in  some sense unjustified,  the 
resulting real appreciation is likely to force the government’s hand.  I* 
6.6  Conclusion 
This paper has constructed a dynamic framework in which liberali- 
zation and stabilization measures of the type recently instituted in Latin 
America’s  Southern Cone can be studied.  The model represents an 
attempt to capture some salient features of advanced industrializing 
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slow labor market adjustment, and an important role for imported pro- 
duction inputs. Because the model encompasses economies with closed 
and open capital accounts as special cases, the impact of capital-account 
restrictions on the effects of policy decisions is highlighted. A further 
advantage of this general framework is its ability to delineate the mac- 
roeconomic consequences of opening the capital account. 
Liberalization of the capital account leads not to an initial period of 
real exchange rate appreciation but to a real depreciation and an in- 
crease in foreign debt over the long run. The economy passes through 
alternating phases of  boom and slump in the transition process. De- 
valuation is nonneutral even in the long run and may be contractionary 
in the short run. Even though this measure entails an initial real de- 
preciation effect, it drives the economy to a new stationary position in 
which the relative price of  tradables is lower than it was initially. Fi- 
nally, attempts to disinflate by manipulating the rate of currency de- 
valuation may have minimal effects under capital mobility. When capital 
is immobile, however, disinflation has effects qualitatively similar to 
those of closing the capital account. 
Although these results are certainly suggestive regarding the South- 
ern Cone experience, the limits of the model’s applicability should be 
recognized. There is no explicit description of the domestic banking 
sector, so that the effects of any liberalization there-and  of its timing 
relative to liberalization elsewhere-are not studied. Similarly, the model 
assumes that  the trade account is open and that the fiscal deficit is 
under control. In reality, the order of liberalization and the degree of 
consistency of macroeconomic policies differed among the Southern 
Cone countries. The consequences of these differences have been dis- 
cussed elsewhere by a number of writers and are surveyed in Edwards 
( 1984). 
In this context, an important omitted variable of the model is im- 
perfect credibility: public disbelief in the permanence of reform initi- 
atives and in official promises not to inflict capital losses through de- 
valuation or other measures. There can be little doubt that incredulity 
played a central role in both the unfolding and the unraveling of the 
Southern Cone stabilization programs. Our understanding of this phe- 
nomenon is incomplete at this time, but it is at the top of the agenda 
for future research. 
Appendix 
The purpose of this appendix is to supply a detailed discussion of the 
assumptions underlying the model’s dynamics. Let (qm,  K)  denote the 225  Capital Flows, the Current Account, and the Real Exchange Rate 
steady state of the system described by equations (29) and (32) in the 
text. The linear approximation to the system near its steady state is: 
Dq = qmr,(q  - 4-1  + qer2(zr  - K:), 
DK = flI(4 -  qy) + flz(K' - K:), 
where all functions are evaluated at (qy,  lk",).  Since the two dynamic 
variables are predetermined, the linearized system is stable if  its two 
characteristic roots are negative. Necessary and sufficient conditions 
for this are the trace condition qmT, + f12 < 0 and the determinant 
condition (35). 
Direct calculation using (28) and (32) shows that in the neighborhood 
of the steady state, 
rl =  TI -  a'z  + (1 - a)(i - y)zlq-~  x 
(K'  + x  + k)l/[l  + IT(1 - u)(1 - y)z*I, 
r2 = - n(i -  U)(zlql-y  + z2~')/[1  + 7F(i -  a)(i -  y)z21, 
fl, = yT' - {[I - (q/a)la' -  (u/q))(z/q) 
o2  = R* - wq)  + (1 -  ayai{z1q1-~  + z2[~'  + (1 - y)r2]}. 
-  (1 - r)[(a/q) + (1 - ~YaI[zlq-~(K'  + x  + k) + zJJ, 
The inequalities (30) and (34) are predicted on the assumption that 
the economy is near its long-run equilibrium. Those in (30) also rely 
on the assumption that 1  + T  (1 - u)  (1 - y)z2 > 0. For a discussion 
of this condition, and a theoretical rationale, see Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1984). Once it  is  assumed that  1  + IT  (1 -  u) (1 -  y)zz > 0, the 
additional assumption K  + x  + k > 0 (which is clearly stronger than 
necessary) yields (30). The inequality  f12 < 0 in  (34) is  simply the 
standard requirement that an increase in wealth raise absorption by 
more than it raises income at a constant real exchange rate. As was 
mentioned in the text, the assumption that f12 <  0 is needed for brevity 
rather than for stability. 
Inequality (36) follows immediately from the partial derivatives listed 
above and from the assumption that  1  + IT  (1 - a) (1 - y)z2 > 0. 
Notes 
1.  For discussions of individual countries, see Foxley (1982), Harberger (1982), Buffie 
(1985), Calvo (1983; 1986), Dornbusch (1985), and Edwards (1985). See also the papers 
and discussion collected in Ardito Barletta, Blejer, and Landau (1983). A full account 
of the collapse of the Southern Cone reform programs is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Calvo (1986), Dlaz-Alejandro (1984), Dornbusch (1985), and Edwards (1985) have ad- 
dressed that topic. Edwards (1984) surveyed some of the relevant analytical questions. 226  Maurice Obstfeld 
2.  A single exchange rate regime,  the pegged  rate, is assumed  throughout.  Bruno 
(1983) discussed interactions  between the degree of capital mobility and the exchange 
rate regime. 
3.  Related models have been developed by Blejer and Mathieson (1981), Calvo (1982), 
and van Wijnbergen (1983a). Blejer and Mathieson (1981) stressed the role of the domestic 
banking system. The setup in Calvo (1982) is similar to that of the present paper; but 
whereas a simple  Phillips  curve governs the wage  dynamics described  below,  Calvo 
assumed that the domestic price level was an index of firms’ predetermined output prices, 
set at staggered intervals. Another related model, in Buffie (1985), incorporated a banking 
system and a richer menu of assets but did not pursue the intrinsic dynamics arising 
from asset accumulation.  Khan and Knight (1981) estimated and simulated a fairly de- 
tailed macro model of a developing country. 
4. By assuming perfect foresight I am pushing aside undoubtedly important questions 
about the credibility  of  government  policies  and the  speed  with  which  the public’s 
expectations adjust to new policy regimes. See section 6.5.2  below for a further discussion. 
5. The immobile capital model could be modified to allow for a fixed positive level of 
foreign asset holdings. Unfortunately, this change would lead to considerable additional 
complexity. Under strict capital controls the market price of domestically held foreign 
assets is the (dual) financial foreign exchange rate, an endogenous variable determined 
within the model. It is the wealth effect of financial exchange rate movements that makes 
the introduction  of a parallel financial foreign exchange market  a nontrivial task. See 
Cumby (1984) and the chapter in this volume  by  Dornbusch for dual exchange rate 
models of this type, and Obstfeld (1986) for an optimizing analysis. An alternative dual 
exchange rate regime is one in which the authorities peg the financial rate to allow some 
target level of  private external asset accumulation (Adams and Greenwood 1985). 
6. See equation (40) below. The parameter x  can be altered by certain government 
policies,  for example, a discrete devaluation,  AE,  of the currency not  matched  by a 
“helicopter”  domestic credit increase, AC, satisfying equation (20), or by an increase 
in  domestic credit  not  matched  by  the  appropriate devaluation.  Along  this  model’s 
perfect-foresight paths, however, official transfer payments always compensate the pri- 
vate sector  for the depreciation of its money holdings against foreign currency. (Of course, 
any individual takes these transfers to be parametric and so does not view them as a 
function of  his or  her own portfolio  decisions.)  The effect  of an “uncompensated” 
devaluation on  the relationship between MIE and F is discussed in section 6.5. 
7. It should be kept in mind that under rule (20), the experiment of raising q corre- 
sponds to a rise in E (a devaluation) coupled with a compensating increase in domestic 
credit. (See note 6.) More simply, q can be viewed as rising through a fall in the pre- 
determined nominal wage. 
8.  Note that both loci are flatter when there is no capital mobility. 
9. Khan and Zahler (1983) used a detailed simulation model to evaluate the effects of 
opening the capital account. The dynamic adjustment produced  by their model is quite 
similar to that found below. Dorlhiac (1984) studied the effect of financial opening on 
the real exchange rate in an intertemporal maximizing model. Calvo (1982) also studied 
capital-account liberalization, identifying its effects with those of an  increase in domestic 
wealth.  He obtained dynamics similar to those obtained here, but his long-run results 
were different because he ignored the service account. See Calvo (1983) and Edwards 
(1984) for alternative, less formal discussions of liberalization. 
10.  Strictly speaking,  the use of the diagrams for this experiment  is valid only for 
small changes. This implies that the difference between the pre- and postreform nominal 
interest rates cannot be too great. 
11. The broken lines in figures 6.3 and 6.4 are, of course, the loci describing prereform 
internal and external balance. The assumption that n2  < 0 is what permits the assertion 
that a fall in ZC,  all else equal, improves the current account. 
12.  Under capital mobility, the nominal interest rate will fully and immediately reflect 
the possibility of devaluation. This  may  explain  why  in Argentina,  for example,  the 
difference  between the  local and world nominal  rates generally  exceeded the prean- 
nounced rate of devaluation in the period after January 1979. As Calvo (1983) observed, 
however, expected devaluation  should not affect the expected real interest rate, for it 
raises the nominal rate and expected inflation by the same amount. 227  Capital Flows, the Current Account, and the Real Exchange Rate 
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Comment  Marcelo Selowsky 
Maurice Obstfeld has developed a well-specified structure,  able to trace 
the dynamics and steady-state values of an economy experiencing a 
liberalization of its capital account. Given the world’s interest rate, a 
specified rate of crawl in the nominal exchange rate, and an assumption 
of perfect foresight, the model traces the dynamics of the real exchange 
rate and the economy’s net external assets. The model shows that the 
removal of impediments to capital movements causes an initial period 
of real appreciation, followed  in the long run  by  a real  depreciation 
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and an increase in  the country’s foreign  debt. When capital is fully 
mobile, a change in the rate of crawl is neutral; it does not affect the 
steady-state values of the real variables. 
The central issue raised by the paper is whether the model can be 
useful in addressing the typical welfare questions that have arisen from 
the experiences of Argentina and Chile, where the liberalization of the 
capital account during the 1970s was a major determinant of the sub- 
stantial increase in private external debt. (The case of Chile better fits 
the initial conditions of the model, namely, internal equilibrium made 
possible by the ability of Chile to control its fiscal deficit.) 
Two major questions can be raised  in this regard:  concerns about 
the nonoptimality of the size of the debt, that is, whether the private 
sector overborrowed, even after we have corrected for the influence 
of unanticipated  external factors (movements in dollar interest rates 
and the terms of trade); and concerns about whether the rate of crawl 
is truly neutral, that is, to what extent alternative nominal exchange 
rate regimes during the period of liberalization conveyed different real 
signals to the capital and current accounts. In other words, what nom- 
inal exchange regime institutes the best system of intertemporal signals 
when the capital account is opened? 
These welfare questions do not arise if  perfect foresight is assumed. 
By definition, this assumption rules out the possibility of over- or un- 
derborrowing. The assumption implies that private agents are always 
able to foresee the oscillation and convergence of the real interest rate 
and adjust their external borrowing accordingly. Given dollar interest 
rates, it also means that agents are able to foresee the oscillation and 
convergence of the real exchange rate. And given the rate of crawl in 
the nominal exchange rate, it ultimately means that agents are able to 
foresee the oscillation and convergence of the price level of nontraded 
goods that will  result from the opening of the capital account. These 
are indeed strong assumptions. 
At issue here is what type of nominal exchange rate regime is most 
successful in helping private agents better predict the oscillation of the 
real rate-particularly  its ultimate depreciation. A failure to foresee 
the ultimate real depreciation can generate excessive foreign borrowing 
and excessive reallocation  of resources from the traded to the non- 
traded sector during the period  of liberalization.  Additional compli- 
cations arise when  alternative  nominal  regimes induce  a differential 
“nonoptimality”  in the movement of the capital and current accounts. 
In other words, there might be a trade-off in the efficiency with which 
a particular nominal regime conveys the proper signals to the capital 
and current accounts. A floating nominal exchange rate, for example, 
might increase the short-run appreciation of the real rate. This might 
lead, in turn, to an excessive movement of resources from the traded 231  Capital Flows, the Current Account, and the Real Exchange  Rate 
to the nontraded sector, or it might increase the expectations of a future 
real depreciation, thus restraining external borrowing. A fixed nominal 
rate, on the other hand, might dampen the short-run real appreciation 
if  there are lags in the upward movement of  nontraded goods prices. 
This fixed rate will dampen the movement of resources from the traded 
sector; but, it might also lower the expectation of a future real depre- 
ciation, thus encouraging an excessive amount of  ex ante borrowing. 
These issues should be incorporated into future extensions of  Obst- 
feld’s paper. This Page Intentionally Left Blank